American Law Reports: ALR E-Annos

Due to their late-breaking nature, the texts cited by these e-annos are only available online through Westlaw. These annotations are often (though not always) published in subsequent ALR bound volumes.

Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on State Antitrust Claim
The United States Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 52 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1977) adopted an "indirect purchaser rule" pursuant to which only direct purchasers of a manufacturer's product are entitled to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 15) for violations of federal antitrust laws. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 S. Ct. 1661, 104 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1989) ruled that the Illinois Brick decision did not preempt state antitrust laws. A number of states have enacted statutes expressly authorizing indirect purchasers to seek damages for violations of state antitrust laws. In states which have not enacted such statutes, the right of a retail buyer to sue a manufacturer of an allegedly price-fixed product under state antitrust law is not clear. Cases discussing the right of a retail buyer of allegedly price-fixed products to sue the manufacturer under state antitrust laws are collected in this annotation.

Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on State Antitrust Claim, 2003 A.L.R.5th 16

Arbitration-Equitable Estoppel Against Nonsignatory
Whether a party has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration generally depends on the terms of the contract, if any, made between the parties to that dispute. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq., which gives federal courts authority to enforce arbitration agreements and awards, requires that such an agreement be in writing. Notwithstanding such requirement, it has been accepted as a general principle that non-signatories to an arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate their claims with a signatory in certain circumstances, such as where the non-signatory is suing directly under the agreement containing the arbitration clause or has directly benefited from such agreement in some other way. This annotation collects and discusses federal cases in which the courts have expressly considered and discussed application of the federal law doctrine of equitable estoppel against an acknowledged non-signatory of an agreement containing a provision mandating arbitration, to compel arbitration.

Application of Equitable Estoppel Against Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration under Federal Law, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 22

Arbitration-Equitable Estoppel by Nonsignatory
Whether a party has agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration generally depends on the terms of the contract, if any, made between the parties to that dispute. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1 et seq., which gives federal courts authority to enforce arbitration agreements and awards, requires that such an agreement be in writing. Notwithstanding such requirement, it has been accepted as a general principle that signatories to an arbitration agreement can be compelled to arbitrate their claims with a non-signatory where a careful review of the relationship among the parties, the contracts they signed, and the issues that had arisen among them discloses that the issues the nonsignatory is seeking to resolve in arbitration are intertwined with the agreement that the estopped party has signed. This annotation collects and discusses federal cases in which the courts have expressly considered and discussed application of the federal law doctrine by an acknowledged non-signatory of an agreement containing a provision mandating arbitration, to compel arbitration.

Application of Equitable Estoppel by Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration under Federal Law, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 18

Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
The Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA), 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§ 501 et seq., was enacted at the end of 2003 as a recodification and modernization of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940. Its purpose is to "strengthen and expedite the national defense" by enabling servicemembers "to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation" without concerns about their legal and financial affairs, which the SCRA serves to mitigate by temporarily suspending judicial and administrative proceedings, and easing financial burdens. This annotation will discuss the various protections provided by the SCRA and how they have been construed and applied by both the federal and state courts.

Construction and Application of Federal Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 App. U.S.C.A. ss 501 et seq., 2007 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 6

"Zero Tolerance" Law for Underage Drinking and Driving
Many states have enacted "zero tolerance" laws in an effort to reduce underage drinking and driving. Such statutes may prohibit anyone under the age of 21 to drive with a specified blood alcohol content, i.e., 0.02 percent or higher, or in some instances, criminalize underage drinking and driving after consuming any amount of alcohol. Such statutes may provide for summary suspension of the motorist's license to operate a motor vehicle upon a finding of the requisite blood alcohol content or refusal to submit to a chemical test. This annotation collects and discusses those cases in which courts have determined the validity, construction, and application of state "zero tolerance" laws relating to underage drinking and driving.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State "Zero Tolerance" Laws Relating to Underage Drinking and Driving, 2006 A.L.R. 6th 11

Bankruptcy Proceedings Involving LLCs
A limited liability company (LLC) affords entrepreneurs the conduit taxation of a partnership along with the limited liability of a corporation. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(9)(A)(ii), defines a corporation as including, among other entities, a partnership association organized under a law that makes only the capital subscribed responsible for the debts of such association. Bankruptcy courts treat partnership agreements as executory contracts which, if unperformed by either party, would constitute a material breach of the partnership agreement. The following annotation collects cases which have addressed issues concerning the bankruptcy proceedings of LLCs and their members.

Issues Concerning Bankruptcy Proceedings of Limited Liability Companies, 2007 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 7

Malpractice Action as Core Bankruptcy Proceeding
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b), the federal district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of civil proceedings, but nothing in the code provision prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under the code or arising in or related to a case under the code. It is logical that proceedings on a motion to abstain from hearing a proceeding arising under the code or arising in or related to a case under the code are core proceedings since the issue of abstention is closely akin to the core versus non-core question and the statutory provision governing core-non-core determinations states that the bankruptcy judge shall determine whether a proceeding is core or is a proceeding otherwise related to a case under the code. Likewise, it is logical that proceedings on a motion to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the bankruptcy case itself should be core since nothing could be closer to the core of a bankruptcy case than a request to extinguish the case in its entirety. The issue arises as to whether an action for malpractice is a "core proceeding" in bankruptcy pursuant to the dictates of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c), and whether abstention is appropriate by the bankruptcy court under such circumstances. This annotation discusses whether an action for malpractice is a "core proceeding" in bankruptcy pursuant to the dictates of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c), and whether abstention is appropriate by the bankruptcy court under such circumstances.

Action for Malpractice as Core Proceeding in Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c), 2007 A.L.R. Fed.2d 4

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9010(a)
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9010(a) governs representation and appearance of parties in a bankruptcy proceeding, defining a party's authority to act personally or through an attorney or nonattorney representative. The Rule grants various parties to a bankruptcy proceeding the right to appear either in the party's own behalf or by an attorney authorized to practice in the bankruptcy court and further gives parties the right to perform any act not constituting the practice of law by means of an authorized agent, attorney-in-fact, or proxy. This annotation collects federal and state cases construing or applying Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9010(a).

Construction and Application of Fed. Rules Bankr. Proc. Rule 9010(a), 11 U.S.C.A., Providing That Debtor, Creditor, Equity Security Holder, Indenture Trustee, Committee or Other Party May Appear in Case Under Code and Act Either in Entity's Own Behalf or by an Attorney Authorized to Practice Law in the Court, and Perform Any Act Not Constituting the Practice of Law, by Authorized Agent, Attorney in Fact, or Proxy, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 8

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, was enacted on April 20, 2005. BAPCPA is the first wholesale modification of U.S. bankruptcy law since the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. While most provisions of BAPCPA are effective only as to cases filed 180 or more days after the act's enactment, i.e., on or after October 17, 2005, a few provisions are effective immediately.This annotation both discusses the changes made by BAPCPA and collects and analyzes all the cases applying that act.

Validity, Construction and Application of Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 2005 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 3

Local Summary Judgment Rules
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83 permits the federal district courts to establish local rules having the force of law. Litigants are presumed to have notice of the local rules. District courts have broad discretion in interpreting, applying, and determining the requirements of their own local rules. The filings of parties responding to summary judgment motions may be addressed in either the district courts' general local rules covering motions or in specific local rules governing summary judgments. Many federal courts have applied local summary judgment rules to filings other than statements of facts submitted by the nonmoving party. Federal cases which have applied local summary judgment rules of federal district courts to filings of the nonmoving party other than statements of facts are collected in the following annotation.

Application of Local Summary Judgment Rules to Nonmoving Party in Federal Courts--Filings Other than Statements of Facts, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 20

FMLA-Leave Year Notification Requirements
Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) (29 U.C.S.A. §§ 2601 et seq.), eligible employees are entitled to twelve weeks of leave in any twelve-month period for certain specified reasons. An employer is permitted to choose among four methods for calculating the twelve-month period during which FMLA leave is available, the FMLA "leave year," but neither the statute nor its regulations indicate whether or to what extent notice of an employer's choice of methods is required. This annotation collects and analyzes the cases discussing whether employers are required to notify employees of their method of calculating the FMLA leave year, and, if so, whether notification was sufficient.

Requirement that Employers Notify Employees of Their Method of FMLA Leave Calculation under Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1), 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 19

Bar to Equitable Relief in Domestic Relations Proceeding or Dispute
The doctrine of unclean hands has been used by courts to bar equitable claims when a petitioner's misconduct is related to the dispute at issue, and has often been applied in the context of family law issues, specifically in cases of financial misconduct. This annotation examines the doctrine of unclean hands in the context of a variety of particular kinds of domestic relations cases, including divorce or separation, annulment, and property claims in the context of termination of marriage, especially the effect of fraudulent conduct. The annotation also addresses the effect of the unclean hands doctrine on questions of alimony and child support, as well as custody and visitation rights. In conclusion, the annotation examines the unclean hands doctrine in the context of adoption, paternity, and proceedings for the termination of parental rights.

Unclean Hands as Bar to Equitable Relief in Domestic Relations Proceeding or Dispute, 2002 A.L.R.5th 17

Larceny — "Property of Another"
It is axiomatic that you can't steal something that already belongs to you, and that you can't steal something from someone else if it doesn't belong to them in the first place. Yet it can sometimes be difficult to determine just what is the "property of another" in the context of criminal statutes prohibiting the theft, embezzlement, purloining, or other wrongful appropriation of another person's or legal entity's property with the intent to permanently deprive that person or entity of the property. Questions may arise not only as to where the title or right of possession lies, but also whether the item or material involved is even "property" at all in the legal sense that it may be "owned" by anyone. These concepts and others involving the meaning of the term "property of another" as used in penal statutes for theft or related offenses involving such property are addressed in this annotation. The annotation takes a tripartite approach to its subject matter, setting forth basic rules on what is property, then examining the respective property interest claims of both complainants and defendants with regard to particular classes of property and particular circumstances of alleged deprivation.

What Is "Property of Another" Within Statute Proscribing Larceny, Theft, or Embezzlement of Property of Another, 2002 A.L.R.5th 19

Laches or Acquiescence as Defense
This annotation details the circumstances in which a divorced obligee spouse or custodial parent is subject to equitable defenses of laches or acquiescence in nonpayment of alimony or child support arrearages, so as to be unable to recover back payments of such obligations under a final decree of divorce.

Laches or Acquiescence as Defense, So As to Bar Recovery of Arrearages of Permanent Alimony or Child Support, 2003 A.L.R.5th 9

Thinking as Major Life Activity under Americans with Disabilities Act
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C.A. §§12101-12213) the term "disability" is defined in 42 U.S.C.A. §12102(2) to mean (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment. In a number of cases,
courts have considered whether an impairment affecting a person's ability to think falls within this definition. This annotation collects and analyzes cases construing or applying the Americans with Disabilities Act insofar as it discusses when a condition or impairment affecting one's ability to speak constitutes a disability under 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).

What Constitutes Substantial Limitation on Major Life Activity of Thinking, and Whether Thinking Qualifies as Such,
for Purposes of Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 TO 12213, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 4

The United States Supreme Court held in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589, 2 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1502 (1981) that on dissolution of a marriage, federal law precluded a state court from dividing military nondisability retired pay pursuant to state community property laws. Congress subsequently enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq., to place the state courts in the same position they were in before the Supreme Court's McCarty decision with respect to the treatment of nondisability military retired or retainer pay and to remove the federal preemption found to exist by the Supreme Court and permit state and other courts of competent jurisdiction to apply pertinent state or other laws in determining whether military retired or retainer pay should be divisible. The USFSPA does not mandate, but rather authorizes state courts to consider military retirement benefits as marital property, and thus subject to equitable division. Many state courts have construed or applied the USFSPA since its enactment. This annotation collects and analyses cases which have addressed the construction and application of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq., in state court divorce proceedings.

Construction and Application of Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act in State Court Divorce Proceedings, 2003 A.L.R.5th 7

Retirement of Husband
Retirement ordinarily constitutes a very real change of circumstances, involving, among other things, more leisure time but, in many instances, less income. As a divorced husband realizes that the reduced income will have to cover the same costs and expenses formerly covered by a higher level of income, he may well look upon his alimony obligation as a place to "cut corners," if he can get his payments modified. To that end, he will allege that his retirement constitutes the changed circumstances that warrant reducing his alimony, but, since not every change of circumstances will justify altering the amount of alimony a husband is required to pay, the question then arises whether the events surrounding the husband's retirement really do constitute the necessary "change of circumstances" that will warrant modification of the husband's divorce decree. While a support obligor's retirement age may be considered in assessing the overall reasonableness of his or her retirement, it has been held that there is no presumptive age for an objectively reasonable retirement, but if the husband has chosen early retirement, the situation is scrutinized carefully to determine, initially, whether his primary reason for taking retirement may have been to avoid his support obligation. Unless the taking of early retirement can be shown to have been for such reason, it has been held that an objectively reasonable retirement, taken in good faith and without intent to defeat the support obligation, does constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances so that a modification of support obligation may be considered. This annotation collects and discusses the cases which have considered whether the early retirement of the husband is a change of circumstances warranting modification of the divorce decree.

Retirement of Husband as Change of Circumstances Warranting Modification of Divorce Decree - Early Retirement, 2002 ALR5th 22

Voting Rights Act – Native Americans
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted, and amended several times, to protect the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee that the right to vote shall not be abridged or denied on account of race or color. The most commonly discussed provisions are Section 2 and Section 5. Section 2, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973, prohibits the imposition or application of any voting procedures which deny, abridge, or dilute the right to vote. Section 5, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1973c, requires jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination to submit every change in their voting procedures to the United States Department of Justice for preclearance. The Act also banned the discriminatory use of literacy tests as a voting requirement and mandated the use of minority languages in the electoral process in certain jurisdictions. All of these provisions have been applied in cases involving the rights of Native Americans to vote. This annotation will review all of the cases which have applied this Act to Native Americans.

Application of Voting Rights Act to Native Americans, 2007 A.L.R. Fed.2d 5

Escalators
Most people take the safety of escalators for granted, and step on and off them with hardly a second thought. Nevertheless, like any other machine, escalators can break, be poorly designed or repaired, or otherwise pose a danger to the public. These problems may also be the result of heavy usage or vandalism, especially since escalators are in constant use but are not generally under constant supervision. Accordingly, many courts have considered under what circumstances manufacturers, installers, owners, or maintainers of escalators can be liable for injuries resulting to users thereof, with varying results, as this annotation illustrates.

Liability for Injury on, or in Connection with, Escalator, 2002 A.L.R.5th 24

Temporary Taking of Property
When a governmental entity temporarily takes property pursuant to its power of eminent domain, whether the temporary taking is a physical taking or a regulatory taking, just compensation must be paid under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and most state constitutions. The cases discussing the measure and elements of compensation for a temporary taking of property are collected in the following annotation.

Elements and Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain Proceeding for Temporary Taking of Property, 2002 A.L.R.5th 3

Judicial Review under Magnuson-Stevens Act
The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883, is a comprehensive system of regulation of the federal waters of the United States, up to 200 miles off the coasts. The Act, which was enacted in response to evidence of massive domestic and foreign overfishing and other problems in the various ocean fisheries, primarily seeks to regulate fishing though the enactment of fishery management plans by the Secretary of Commerce, through various administrative agencies, and with the assistance of area councils responsible for a portion of ocean. With certain exceptions, the Act provides, in 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(f), for judicial review "if a petition for such review is filed within 30 days after the date on which the regulations are promulgated or the action is published in the Federal Register." The reason for the short limitations period appears to be primarily the fact that the Act provides that before a rule is enacted, the public has numerous opportunities to comment on and challenge proposed rules, which rules are often amended in accordance with such discussions. A number of courts have construed 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(f) in a variety of ways, as this annotation illustrates.

Validity, Construction, and Application of judicial review provisions of Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act
(16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(f)), 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 12

Severance pay plans under ERISA
Severance pay is generally a payment made by employers to employees whose services are terminated without cause. The reasons why employers choose to extend severance pay are varied. Among other reasons employers may want to offer severance benefits in order to reduce its workforce, to assist former employees during the period of unemployment following job loss, to assure key employees who are concerned about a change in control of the company, or to retain employees for a certain time period in order to assist with a company's reorganization. Likewise the payment of severance benefits can occur in a myriad of contexts such as reductions in force, sales of businesses to a successor employer, or relocations of facilities. Where the employment of employees is terminated, claims for severance benefits often arise. When severance benefits are provided under an "employee benefit plan," the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.) has been held to govern such claims for severance benefits. Also the doctrine of ERISA preemption
(29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a)) serves to preempts state law claims for benefits and often results in the removal of a plaintiff's action based on state law claims to federal court. However if the severance pay is not provided under an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA, a party may be able to preserve his or her claims for severance benefits under state law theories. Therefore a key question to consider in bringing or defending a claim for severance benefits is: Does an employee
benefit plan exist? This annotation addresses that question of when severance pay constitutes an employee benefit plan for purposes of ERISA.

When Does Severance Pay Constitute "Employee Benefit Plan" for Purposes of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. ss 1001), 2002 A.L.R. Fed. 3

Double Hearsay
Admissibility of an out-of-court statement which includes at least one other out-of-court statement depends on whether the multilevel statement fits within a definition of non-hearsay or an exception to the hearsay rule. Most courts hold that each level of the hearsay statement must independently pass muster under the hearsay rule. In many instances, courts reject an entire multilevel statement because one of its layers does not fall within a definition of non-hearsay or a hearsay exception. This annotation collects and discusses all of the federal cases discussing the admissibility of so-called double hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 805.

Admissibility of Hearsay Within Hearsay, or "Double Hearsay," Under Rule 805 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 805), 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 7

Human Medical Experimentation
The very concept of non-therapeutic, nonconsensual human medical research and experimentation is one which shocks the conscience. Nazi medical atrocities of this kind horrified the world when they were given prominence at the post-World War II Nuremberg trials. On the other hand, it is clear that in order for medical science to advance, in most instances drugs, therapies, or particular lines of scientific research must be tried on humans after they were tried on animals. However, getting patients to agree to serve as "guinea pigs," with full knowledge of the possibility of serious and permanent injury, is not easy. Accordingly, and presumably exonerating themselves on the grounds that "the ends justify the means," medical and scientific researchers in a number of instances have performed experiments on people without their informed consent. Courts have reached a variety of conclusions based on a wide spectrum of possible bases for liability for nonconsensual human medical experimentation, as this annotation illustrates.

Recovery for Nonconsensual Human Medical Experimentation, 2002 A.L.R.5th 11

Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act
The Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 ("MMTJA") is a new jurisdictional act greatly expanding the original and removal jurisdiction of the federal courts. It grants district courts original jurisdiction of mass tort cases involving at least 75 deaths in a discrete location arising from a single accident where there is only minimal diversity between adverse parties. It also provides for abstention in cases where the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of the same state of which the primary defendants are also citizens, and the claims will be governed primarily by that state's laws. This annotation collects and analyzes all of the cases that have construed and/or applied the MMTJA.

Construction and Application of Multiparty, Multiforum, Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 21

Factors other than Proximity, Explanation, Amount, Packaging, and Odor
In tracing funds to drug trafficking in order to determine whether forfeiture of such assets is warranted under state law, courts must frequently confront the situation where there is no direct evidence tying the particular funds to a drug transaction, and the state seeks to rely on circumstantial evidence of traceability. In such cases, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances. This annotation collects and analyzes those state cases in which courts have considered whether currency, bank accounts, or cash equivalents are traceable to drug trafficking so as to justify forfeiture, or declaration as contraband, under state law to the extent that courts rely on factors other than the proximity of the assets to drugs or related materials, the claimants' exculpatory explanations or lack thereof, the amount or packaging of the funds or drugs, or the odor of drugs.

Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law--Factors Other than Proximity, Explanation, Amount, Packaging,
and Odor, 2005 A.L.R.6th 1

Amount and Packaging of Money and Drugs
Forfeiture of assets used by drug dealers in connection with drug trafficking, or acquired as a result of drug trafficking, has become a tool frequently used by states to combat the illegal drug business. When the asset at issue is not something inherently illegal to possess, but something that is lawful in itself and becomes subject to forfeiture only because it is
traceable to illegal drug trafficking, it is necessary for the state entity seeking forfeiture to offer evidence to connect the asset sought to be forfeited to the illegal drug business. When the asset in question is currency, a bank account, or a cash equivalent, and no direct evidence of the connection of the specific asset to a drug transaction is available, states often seek
to rely, at least in part, on evidence that the amount or packaging of the money, or the amount or packaging of drugs in connection with which the money is discovered, conform to a pattern frequently used by drug dealers. This annotation collects and analyzes the
state cases in which courts have expressly considered the amount or packaging of money, or the amount or packaging of drugs, found in connection with alleged drug trafficking in determining whether currency, bank accounts, or cash equivalents are traceable to such drug trafficking so as to be subject to forfeiture, or declaration as contraband, under state law.

Evidence Considered in Tracing Currency, Bank Account, or Cash Equivalent to Illegal Drug Trafficking so as to Permit Forfeiture, or Declaration as Contraband, Under State Law--Amount and Packaging of Money and Drugs, 2004 A.L.R.5th 3

Vexatious litigant
A state vexatious litigant statute permits restrictions on access to the courts by a litigant judicially determined to be vexatious, at least when the litigant is proceeding pro se. The purpose of such a statute is to prevent abuse of the judicial system by those persons who persistently and habitually file lawsuits without reasonable grounds, or who otherwise engage in frivolous conduct in the courts. These statutes have been consistently upheld by the courts. This annotation collects and analyzes the federal and state cases discussing the validity, construction and application of state vexatious litigant statutes.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Vexatious Litigant Statutes, 2006 A.L.R.6th 4

Reclamation Reform Act
In 1982, Congress passed the Reclamation Reform Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 390aa et seq. (RRA), which comprehensively revised the Reclamation Act of 1902 and other reclamation law. Courts have construed and applied various provisions of the RRA, including 43 U.S.C.A. § 390uu under which the United States waives sovereign immunity in actions regarding contracts executed pursuant to federal reclamation law. This annotation shall collect and analyze the cases which have construed or applied the RRA.

Construction and Application of Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 390aa et seq., 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 16

Hearings on Denials of Applications for Naturalization
With respect to applications for naturalization under the Immigration and Nationality Act, that Act - as amended by the Immigration Act of 1990 - specifies under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1447, inter alia, the right of an applicant to an administrative hearing on a denial of the application as well as the right of the applicant to apply to a United States district court for a hearing on the matter if no administrative determination is made within a 120-day period following examination of the applicant. This annotation collects and analyzes the federal cases construing and applying the provisions of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1447 governing hearings on denials of applications for naturalization.

Construction and application of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1447 governing hearings on denials of applications for naturalization, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 11

Abusive Tax Shelters
The promotion of abusive tax shelters has wide-reaching effects in our society, including the liability of taxpayers who rely on the promoters' false or fraudulent tax advice, dissipation of the courts' time by continual litigation over frivolous theories, and loss of tax revenues to the government. Section 6700 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C. § 6700, codified at 26 U.S.C.A. § 6700) penalizes the promoting of abusive tax shelters. Subject to the penalty are persons who organize an entity or plan, or participate in its sale, and who have either made statements as to the securing of tax benefits which the person has reason to know is false or fraudulent as to any material matter or made a gross valuation overstatement. The forms used to promote tax shelters are varied, such as tax preparation products, trusts, leases, decoding schemes, and payroll plans. This annotation collects and analyzes the cases in which courts have construed or applied I.R.C. § 6700.

Construction and Application of § 6700 of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.A. § 6700) Imposing Civil Penalties for Promoting Abusive Tax Shelters, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 23

Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Policies
In response to increasing exposure of corporate executives and board members to costly liability arising out of decisions made in the course of business, corporations have sought to attract and retain key personnel by purchasing directors' and officers' liability policies to protect them from the consequences of wrongful acts committed in their capacities as directors and officers. Insurers who offer such policies have inserted various exclusionary endorsements into the contracts in order to reduce their exposure to unreasonable liability, to make the policies more affordable, or to prevent abuses on the part of those insured under the policies. Some of the exclusions are designed to protect the insurer from claims for coverage that rightfully should have been sought under prior policies. Some exclude coverage for certain types of activities and business transactions that may be considered to be too risky or are the subject of other types of insurance. Several exclusions seek to exclude coverage based on the character of the wrongful acts committed by insured directors and officers. This annotation collects and analyzes the cases in which courts have interpreted and applied exclusion provisions contained in directors' and officers' liability insurance policies.

Construction and Application of Exclusion Provisions of Directors and Officers Insurance Policy, Exclusive of Regulatory and Insured vs. Insured Exclusions, 2006 A.L.R.6th 8

Jury Limited to United States Citizens
Service on juries may constitutionally be restricted to citizens of the United States. This annotation collects and summarizes those cases in which courts have determined the validity, construction, and application of the right of a criminal defendant to a jury composed solely of United States citizens.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Right of Criminal Defendant to Jury Composed Solely of United States Citizens, 2007 A.L.R.6th 5

Right to Jury of United States Citizens
Service on juries may constitutionally be restricted to citizens of the United States. This annotation collects and summarizes those cases in which courts have determined the validity, construction, and application of the right of a criminal defendant to a jury composed solely of United States citizens.

Validity, Construction, and Application of Right of Criminal Defendant to Jury Composed Solely of United States Citizens, 2007 A.L.R.6th 5

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997), adopted the reasonable suspicion standard to determine when it is justified to issue a no-knock search warrant. When confronted with the issue of whether the facts and circumstances of a particular entry justify dispensing with the knock and announce requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the trial court must make a fact-specific in the fact-sensitive inquiry as to whether the entry was justifiable under those circumstances. The following annotation collects and analyzes all cases since Richards that discuss the sufficiency, under the individual circumstances of the case, of whether reasonable suspicion existed for the issuance of a "no knock" warrant.

Sufficiency of Showing to Support No-knock Search Warrant - Cases Decided After Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. CT. 1416, 137 L. ED. 2D 615 (1997), 2003 A.L.R.5th 6

Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
In the course of their employment, some employees are exposed to confidential information such as pricing structures, marketing and new product plans, customer information, and manufacturing processes. When these employees leave their jobs and go to work for a competitor, this information can be very useful and theformer employer will often want to prevent the employee from working in a capacity in which he or she might be able to use this information. Under the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine, the former employer argues that in order to perform the new job effectively, the employee cannot help but draw upon this information learned in the previous employment. While this doctrine is not really new, it has gained popularity since it was used in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 10 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1089, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010 (7th Cir. 1995) to grant injunctive relief under the Illinois version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. This annotation collects and analyzes all cases in which the court addressed the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine to prevent a former employer from working for a competitor.

Applicability of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine Barring Employment of Competitor's Former Employee, 2006 A.L.R.6th 2

"Repeated" or "Willful" Violation for Purposes of State Occupational Safety and Health Acts
Several states have enacted occupational safety and health (OSH) acts similar to §§ 17(a) and (e) of 29 U.S.C.A. §666 (a) and (e) of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, (OSHA) 29 U.S.C.A. §651 et seq., that provide for enhanced penalties for repeated, willful or knowing violations by employers of employee occupational safety. This annotation collects and discusses all of the cases that have adjudicated repeated or willful violations of state occupational safety and health acts.

What Constitutes "Repeated" or "Willful" Violation for Purposes of State Occupational Safety and Health Acts, 2003 A.L.R.5th 18

Garmon Preemption Doctrine
Because the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., contains no express preemption provision, and because the NLRA regulates in an area of law traditionally regulated by the states, any NLRA preemption analysis starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law. Under the Garmon preemption doctrine, based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2838, 37 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P 65367 (1959), state regulations and causes of action are presumptively preempted if they concern conduct that is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by the NLRA. A state regulation or cause of action may, however, be sustained if the behavior to be regulated is behavior that is of only peripheral concern to the federal law or touches interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. In such cases, the state's interest in controlling or remedying the effects of the conduct is balanced against both the interference with the National Labor Relations Board's ability to adjudicate controversies committed to it by the NLRA, and the risk that the state will sanction conduct that the NLRA protects. Many federal courts have construed and applied the Garmon preemption doctrine. The federal cases which have addressed the construction and application of the Garmon preemption doctrine are collected in this annotation.

Construction and Application of Garmon Preemption Doctrine by Federal Courts, 2003 A.L.R. Fed. 1

Federal Railroad Safety Act
The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C.A. § 20101 et seq., preempts state or municipal laws, regulations, orders, or standards related to railroad safety and security. There are two exceptions to Congress' total preemptive reach in this area. First, a state may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security until the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad safety matters), or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to railroad security matters), prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the state requirement. Second, a state may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security when the law, regulation, or order is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety or security hazard. Courts have interpreted the preemptive effect of the first exception on numerous occasions. This annotation collects and discusses all of the cases which have considered the preemptive effect of the FRSA, exclusive of the essentially local safety or security hazard savings clause of the Act.

Preemptive Effect of Federal Railroad Safety Act, Exclusive of "Essentially Local Safety or Security Hazard" Savings Clause, 2007 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 8

What Transactions Are "In Commerce" Within Meaning of Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act
Enacted in 1936, the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act (Robinson- Patman Act), June 19, 1936, c. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526, strengthened § 2 of the 1914 Clayton Act's prohibition of price discrimination, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The recognized purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is to reach the operations of large interstate businesses in competition with small local concerns. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a), makes it unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to discriminate in price where either, or any, of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce. To meet the commerce requirement for a claim of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is engaged in interstate commerce; (2) the price discrimination occurred in the course of that commerce; and (3) at least one of the transactions that a plaintiff proffers for comparison to prove discriminatory pricing must have actually moved in commerce, or in other words, have crossed a state line. The Robinson-Patman Act reaches only persons or activities within the flow of interstate commerce--the practical, economic continuity in the generation of goods and services for interstate markets and the transport and distribution to the consumer. Courts have addressed the issue of whether this commerce requirement has been met in cases based on claims of various violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. The federal court cases that have discussed what transactions are "in commerce" within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13 et seq., are collected in this annotation.

What Transactions Are "In Commerce" Within Meaning of Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act (15 U.S.C.A. ss13 et seq.), 2002 A.L.R. Fed. 2

Necessity of Rendering Medical Assistance
The necessity of rendering emergency medical assistance will support warrantless entry into a building to render such assistance to a person therein. Where appropriate, police may conduct a search for persons in need of medical assistance, or for evidence that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance. Any search, however, must be circumscribed by the exigency that permitted the entry. If, during the course of a search, or during the course of rendering emergency aid and assistance, police observe in plain view evidence of a crime, such evidence may be seized. In some cases, entry culminates in the arrest of the occupant. If the court finds that the facts do not support a medical emergency, the officer's entry will be held unlawful, and any arrest or seizure of evidence, whether in plain view or pursuant to a search, will be held unlawful. Additionally, even where the entry was lawful under the medical emergency exception, if the search exceeds the scope of the emergency, any seizure of evidence pursuant to that search will be ruled unlawful. Those cases in which the courts address the lawfulness of an entry under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, and a search or an arrest pursuant thereto, are collected and analyzed in this annotation.

Necessity of Rendering Medical Assistance as Circumstance Permitting Warrantless Entry or Search of Building, 2003 A.L.R.5th 12

Execution of Search Warrant
Most jurisdictions have statutes or court rules that require the execution of search warrants within a certain amount of time after their issuance. These statutes and rules may invalidate search warrants that were valid originally because law enforcement officers waited too long to execute them, thereby allowing the probable cause on which the warrants were based to dissipate. The purpose of requirements for the timely execution of search warrants is to insure that, when execution occurs, there is probable cause to believe that the items that the warrant seeks are in the place to be searched. A delay in the execution of a search warrant may make the information that was the basis for a finding of probable cause stale, and probable cause based on stale information is equivalent to no probable cause at all. Absent probable cause, of course, a search warrant is invalid, and evidence seized pursuant to it will be inadmissible in court. This annotation collects and analyzes the federal and state cases that have decided whether the execution of a search warrant was timely, after having considered the amount of time that elapsed between the issuance of the warrant and its execution.

Timeliness of Execution of Search Warrant, 2002 A.L.R.5th 20

Delay in Execution of Search Warrant
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that search warrants be based on probable cause to believe that particular persons, evidence of a crime, or contraband may be found in the specific location to be searched and courts universally have interpreted the Constitution to require that probable cause similarly exist at the time the warrants are executed. In order to implement this Constitutional requirement, many jurisdictions have rules and laws that set limits on the execution of search warrants. However, for various reasons search warrants may not be executed immediately and some period of delay may intervene which can raise both statutory and Constitutional issues. In practice, this issue is raised in the form of a motion to suppress evidence seized in a search which the petitioner claims was either Constitutionally or statutorily invalid. This annotation collects and reviews the cases in which courts have evaluated whether delayed execution of a search warrant was valid and the evidence seized may, therefore, be admitted in court or whether the search was invalid and the evidence must be excluded, and the analysis is not a straightforward one. Courts examine a multiplicity of factors in determining whether a search was valid: whether the limiting statute, if any, was complied with, whether there was probable cause continuing at the time the search was executed, which itself may depend on the kind of evidence sought, the place to be searched, whether there is evidence of ongoing criminal activity, and further may depend on a host of procedural factors such as whether a record explaining the delay was made and whether prejudice resulting from the delay was proved. This annotation collects and analyzes the state and federal cases determining whether a delay in the execution of a search warrant renders the evidence seized there under inadmissible on either constitutional or statutory grounds.

Delay in Execution of Search Warrant as Affecting Admissibility of Evidence Seized Under Warrant, 2002 A.L.R.5th 18

United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.1(a)
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant's otherwise applicable offense level can be adjusted upward if the offender had an aggravating role in the offense or abused a position of trust or used a special skill in committing the offense, or downward if the offender had a mitigating role in the offense. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, the Guidelines treat an offender as having had an aggravating role in the offense if: the offender was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive; the offender was a manager or supervisor, but not an organizer or leader, and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive; or, the offender was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other than that described above. Courts have been called upon to apply and construe, in drug-related cases, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which provides for a four level sentencing enhancement for an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more participants or which is otherwise extensive. This annotation collects and discusses the cases which have considered the propriety, in cases involving drug offenses, of the sentencing enhancement provided for in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).

Construction and Application of U.S.S.G., s3B1.1(a), 18 U.S.C.A., Providing Sentencing Enhancement for Organizer or Leader
of Criminal Activity Drug-Offenses, 2007 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 2

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A, amended its predecessor, the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663, in two very significant ways. First, unlike under the discretionary VWPA, courts are required to order restitution for crimes covered under the MVRA. Second, in contrast to the earlier legislation, defendants must pay the full amount of their victims' losses regardless of their economic circumstances, though consideration is required for setting payment schedules or possibly ordering only nominal payments. The statute lists the elements of restitution, comprising direct losses incurred as a result of criminal offenses, in cases involving property, bodily injury, or death. This annotation will collect and discuss all the federal court cases which have considered the measure and elements of restitution to which victims are entitled under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act.

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act--Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 15

United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2X1.1
The United States Sentencing Guidelines contain detailed instructions as to how to determine a defendant's sentence by creating categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics. United States Sentencing Guideline section 2X1.1 governs the sentencing of criminal defendants who are convicted of a conspiracy that is not covered by another, specific offense guideline. This Guideline provides that the conspirator should be given a base offense level commensurate with that of the "substantive offense." It permits the sentencing court to enhance the offense level, again pursuant to the guideline for the substantive offense, upon making appropriate findings proven to a "reasonable certainty." It also provides for a reduction to the offense level for certain uncompleted conspiracies. The federal courts have considered numerous challenges to sentences imposed pursuant to section 2X1.1, and this annotation collects and analyzes all of the cases in which the federal courts have construed and applied U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 to conspiracies.

Construction and Application of USSG, &s;2X1.1, 18 U.S.C.A., Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 6

United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2K2.1
Section 2K2.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines prescribes sentences to be imposed for violations of federal firearms statutes, such as illegal possession of a firearm or possession of an illegal firearm. Because sentences can vary widely depending on the applicability of the Guideline's subsections, prosecutors and defendants frequently raise issues of the precise meanings of terms used in the subsections. This annotation discusses judicial constructions of the language of § 2K2.1 and their effect on sentences imposed under that Guideline.

Construction and Effect of United States Sentencing Guideline s 2K2.1 (U.S.S.G. s 2K2.1, 18 U.S.C.A.) Pertaining to Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition and to Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms and Ammunition, 2002 A.L.R. Fed. 9

E-Sign Act
In the pre-word processing and computer era, contract provisions and signatures thereon often required multiple different generations of printed copies of the same document after changes were made. However, with the ever-increasing dominance of computer communications, significant changes, and even the final agreements and signatures, can be reached largely or even solely through the medium of e-mail. In response to numerous questions as to the enforceability of such contractual dealings and understandings, Congress enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001 to 7006. The E-Sign Act provided on the one hand that a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form or an electronic signature was used in its formation, but it also stated that the use or acceptance of electronic signatures was not mandatory. Courts have reached varying conclusions as to the construction and application of the various provisions of the E-Sign Act, as the following annotation illustrates.

Construction and Application of Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-Sign Act), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-7006, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 13

Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Communications Act of 1934 grants the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) broad authority over interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, to secure and protect the public interest and to insure uniformity of regulation. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides for the promotion of competition and the reduction of regulation in the telecommunications industry, in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for consumers and to encourage the rapid deployment of new technology. Since enactment of the two Acts, the Supreme Court has construed and applied both statutes on numerous occasions. This annotation collects and discusses United States Supreme Court cases which have construed and applied the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

Construction and Application of Communications Act of 1934 and Telecommunications Act of 1996 -- United States Supreme Court Cases, 2006 A.L.R. Fed.2d 14

Telecommunications Act "personal wireless service facility"
In § 332 of the Federal Communications Act, generally known as the Telecommunications Act, Congress sought to promote competition and reduce regulation in the establishment of facilities for servicing wireless telephones, pagers, and wireless facsimile machines. It failed, however, to adequately define "personal wireless service facilities" in 47 U.S.C.A. § 332(c)(7)(C)(ii), doing so only in a very circular fashion, as "facilities for the provision of personal wireless services," while the statute fails to define the term "facilities" or "facility." This annotation collects and discusses all of the cases that have construed and applied the "personal wireless service facility" provision of the Federal Communications Act.

Construction and Application of "Personal Wireless Service Facility" Provision of Federal Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.A. 332(c)(7)(C)(ii), 2006 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1

Remarks or Acts of State Trial Judge Criticizing, Rebuking, or Punishing Defense Counsel in Criminal Case
Defendants frequently raise, as an issue on appeal, the question of whether, by remarks or acts, a state trial judge has criticized, rebuked, or punished the defense counsel in a criminal case in such a way that the defendant is prejudiced, necessitating reversal of the defendant's conviction and remand of the case for a new trial. The question has arisen as to the judicial standards to be used in adjudicating such an issue. This annotation collects and discusses state criminal cases and federal habeas corpus cases addressing the question of the standards to be used in addressing a claim that a state trial judge has prejudiced a defendant by remarks or acts criticizing, rebuking or punishing the defense counsel.

Nature and Determination of Prejudice Caused by Remarks or Acts of State Trial Judge Criticizing, Rebuking, or Punishing Defense Counsel in Criminal Case as Requiring New Trial or Reversal--Standards of Judicial Misconduct Generally, 2002 A.L.R.5th 4

Liability of Hospital for Wheelchair Injury
Wheelchairs are a boon for those whose mobility is restricted for a variety of reasons, and are of critical need in hospitals where non-ambulatory patients can be transported within the hospital's premises much more easily than by moving beds or gurneys. However, even where the wheelchair is not defective, careless treatment of a wheelchair patient, such as allowing the patient to fall during transport or a transfer out of or into the wheelchair, can result in the patient being injured. Courts have reached a variety of conclusions as to a hospital's liability for injuries to a patient through the use of wheelchairs, as this annotation illustrates.

Liability of Hospital for Injury Arising from Use of Nondefective Wheelchair, 2007 A.L.R.6th 3

Sudden Mental Stimuli
Heart attacks, strokes, cerebral hemorrhage and other kinds of injuries and illnesses that sometimes lead to death as a result of sudden emotional or mental stimuli in the workplace have increased particularly in recent years. While a majority of the courts have awarded workers' compensation benefits for such injuries or illnesses, there is a significant minority that have declined to do so primarily because the claimants failed to establish that the requirements of the relevant statutory and case law were met, or there were other reasons that precluded the giving of an award. This annotation collects and analyzes the cases that discuss the right to workers' compensation benefits for physical injury or illness suffered by a claimant as a result of sudden mental stimuli and the compensability of particular injuries or illnesses.

Right to Workers' Compensation for Physical Injury or Illness Suffered by Claimant as Result of Sudden Mental Stimuli--Compensability of Particular Injuries and Illnesses, 2003 A.L.R.5th 2